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This paper documents the convergence of incomes across Indian states over the 
period 1965 to 1998.  It departs from traditional analyses of convergence by tracking 
the evolution of the entire income distribution, instead of standard regression and time 
series analyses. The findings reveal twin-peaks dynamics – the existence of two 
income convergence clubs, one at 50 per cent, another at 125% of the national 
average income. Income disparities across states seem to have declined over the 
sixties, only to increase over the following three decades. The observed polarization 
is strongly explained by the disparate distribution of infrastructure, and that of 
education, and to an extent by a number of macroeconomic indicators, that of capital 
expenditure and fiscal deficits. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
 
One of the paradoxes of our times is the co-existence of extreme economic affluence amidst 
enormous pockets of poverty. This holds across countries and even more so within countries, and 
across regions. Cross country and cross regional distributions of per capita incomes seem quite 
volatile. The extremes seem to be diverging away from each other – with the poor becoming 
poorer and the rich richer. Understanding why economies fail to converge is unquestionably 
important for welfare. 
 
Yet, there have been a series of debates about how convergence, and the lack of it, is best 
understood. Within the framework of growth economics, some define convergence as a single 
economy approaching its theoretically derived steady state growth path. Some again, define 
convergence as a notion of catch-up – whether poor economies are catching up with the rich. 
Yet, others still consider both notions as identical.  
 
This paper highlights that how one defines convergence can prove to be crucial in revealing the 
relevant empirical regularities to advance one’s understanding of unequal cross-economy growth 
performances. In particular, we will take the case of the Indian states over 1965-1997, and 
investigate for tendencies of convergence. If we were not to obtain convergence, we are interested 
in other empirical regularities that the distribution may display. For example, if there are no 
cohesive tendencies, does one observe any specific distributional pattern? Do rich economies 
belong to a club of rich countries, while the poor languish behind? And what are the possibilities 
of the poor overtaking the rich? Finally, we will be interested in what processes may underpin 
such dynamics. 
 
Some simple statistics reveal the stark disparities in growth across Indian states – Punjab’s income 
has been at least twice that of Bihar’s, Orissa’s and Rajasthan’s since 1965. Some states have 
doubled their incomes (real GDP per capita) over the period of the mid sixties to the 1990s, while 
the poorest states have hardly managed to get anywhere close to the national average income. 
Most of the poverty too, lies within the poorest states of Rajasthan, Bihar and Orissa. Broadly 
speaking, states of Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra are infrastructurally equivalent to that of a 
middle income group country (like Brazil,) while the poorer states of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar are similar to that of Bangladesh, Mali and Burkina Faso. If we add to it the fact that 
 adult illiteracy and gender bias at death is a substantial problem in the poorest states, we see a 
picture of endemic deprivation that is not captured by average income or growth statistics. 
 
Such empirical characteristics are evident – that income differentials between the states have been 
widely diverging is more than clear. Studies on the Indian states based on the widely popular cross 
section regression approach, of Bajpai and Sachs (1996), Cashin and Sahay (1996), Nagaraj et 
al(1998), Rao et al (1999) Aiyar (2000) emphasise such diverging distributional characteristics, 
which provide us with information no more useful than the statistics discussed earlier. Recent 
theoretical studies within the growth economics framework (Bernaud and Durlauf 1994, Ben-
David 1994, De Long 1994, Esteban and Ray 1994, Galor and Zeira 1993) allow for explicit 
patterns of cross-economy interaction, whereby economies cluster together into groups to 
endogenously emerge. Thus, identifying explicit patterns of cross-economy interaction, may well 
serve to shed some light on various theories which propose that economies evolve within groups 
and not in isolation.  
 
Then again, pinning down a theory of growth is not essential to understanding why the poor 
remain poor and rich persistently remain rich. There could be other mechanisms driving the rich 
and the poor apart, with having nothing to do with the economic growth process. What needs to 
be clarified is that convergence is simply a basic empirical issue, one that reveals patterns of the 
distribution, which may or may not be simple convergence, or divergence, but polarization, 
stratification, convergence club formation, and the lack of it is a symptom of a deeper problem, 
which may or may not be the outcome of some “perverse” growth process. In this paper we are 
interested in the growth paths of many aggregate economies and the implications those have for 
the dynamics of the income distribution across these economies. This, of course, leads to the 
more fundamental question, empirically addressed in this paper: what drives such dynamics of 
cross-state income distributions? Mechanisms of growth may serve to answer this question, and, 
then again, may not.  
 
So, what other empirical regularities, other than that of convergence, may interest the reader? If 
one were to characterize convergence as a notion of catch-up, one could characterize convergence 
as a situation where the poor catch up with the rich. Will the rich continue to be rich, while the 
poor remain poor? What are the possibilities of the poor overtaking the rich, or the rich falling 
behind? Or are the poor languishing behind the rich, caught in a poverty trap? The questions thus 
asked are different from those asked traditionally by growth empiricists, and those inspired by 
more traditional “Kaldorian” “great ratios”, concerning single economy growth dynamics. 
 Uncovering the income dynamics in the sense of convergence as a notion of catch-up will involve 
tracking the evolution of the entire income distribution over the given period of time. The 
primary focus is to understand the cross country patterns of income, rather than explaining only 
within-country dynamics (i.e. the stability of factor shares - the “great ratios” - within a single 
economy, or growth exclusively in terms of factor inputs). 
 
The standard approach for studying convergence derives from such a growth model, proposed by 
Solow (1965) whose empirical interpretation implies that growth rates of an economy are 
inversely related to its initial level of income. Testing for this result has involved running cross 
section regressions of countries on their initial levels of income. However, such an empirical 
methodology while can uncover tendencies of divergence, does not prove tenable in uncovering 
the empirical regularities of the distributional patterns that we wish to expose. Similarly, time 
series approaches, (Bernard and Durlauf, 1996, Carlino and Mills 1993) which track the univariate 
dynamics of income also remains incomplete in describing the dynamics we are interested in – 
while it incorporates the time series dimension, it fails to utilize the cross-section information. 
 
Empirical methods concerning the behaviour of cross section distributions of income (or 
productivity, output or welfare) over time, are traditional to the literature on the dynamics of 
inequality and personal income distributions (Atkinson 1985, Cowell 1985, Shorrocks 1978) In 
this paper, we intend to examine inter-state income inequalities in terms of the behaviour of the 
entire cross section distribution. Similar, if not identical, questions are raised in the dynamics of 
inequality literature, regarding personal income distributions. Is the distribution collapsing, so that 
everyone shows a tendency to become equally well off? Or do we see the distribution increasingly 
disperse whereby the rich become richer, and the poor remain behind? Or, instead, do we observe 
the distribution collate into individual clubs and subgroups, where the distribution thus polarizes 
or stratifies? These stylized facts describing the patterns of cross-state growth may reveal insights 
into the dynamics of what determines such growth processes. 
 
In the distribution dynamics approach, Markov chains are used to approximate and estimate the 
laws of motion of the evolving distribution. The intra-distribution dynamics information is 
encoded in a transition probability matrix (or a stochastic kernel), and the ergodic (or long run) 
distribution associated with this matrix describes the long term behaviour of the income 
distribution. It encompasses both time series and cross section properties of the data 
simultaneously and presents itself as an ideal approach for large data sets. Moreover, this method 
can be extended to identify factors governing the formation of these convergence clubs. 
  
The main results of the paper are outlined as follows: the prominent distribution dynamics 
revealed are that of persistence and immobility. Strong polarizing tendencies are found to exist, 
and incomes exhibit twin peaked dynamics – there exist two convergence clubs, a high income 
club at around 125% of the national average and another at 50% of the national average. Over the 
period 1965-70, one does observe some tendencies of convergence, which gradually dissipate over 
the following decades of the seventies, eighties and the nineties. Cohesive forces within the 
convergence clubs are observed to “tighten” over the latter three decades as well. Finally some 
macroeconomic indicators and some infrastructural indicators, of which fiscal deficits and capital 
expenditure, and education, are found to explain some of the observed dynamics. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the distribution 
dynamics approach. Section 3 presents new stylised facts of the observed polarisation. Section 4 
discusses the empirical literature on the role of various macroeconomic indicators in explaining 
cross country polarisation of economic growth. Section 5 presents results of the various 
conditioning schemes under the distribution dynamics approach to explain the observed stylised 
facts. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Distribution Dynamics Approach     
 
It is standard in most growth analyses to study how one economy, in isolation, grows quickly or 
slowly. The insights developed are then used to explain why some countries grow faster than 
others. Recent analyses in growth economics, however, recognize cross economy interaction that 
endogenously generates groups of economies, where countries endogenously select themselves 
into groups, and thus do not act in isolation. Thus different interaction patterns will generate 
different coalitions, or convergence clubs.  
 
Consider the following caricature of an income distribution. In time period t, there is an initial 
income distribution across the given cross section of economies. Over the given period of time, k 
units, some economies are better off, some others worse, while still others are unchanged. Still 
more, overtaking may occur as well - some poor states may overtaken the relatively rich Thus, by 
time period t + k coalitions, or convergence clubs form, and the distribution breaks up into a bi-
modal distribution, or in other words is polarized. Such distribution dynamics are commonplace.  
  4What would one observe of the above dynamics described, if one were to apply the standard tools 
of cross section regression analysis? First of all, the standard regression approach is unable to 
uncover the interesting dynamics of club formation. More so, if the researcher were to explain the 
dynamics by “controlling” for a number of auxiliary variables, for example levels of investment in 
physical capital and other observable variables, he or she will conclude that capital investment 
explains cross state growth. Such conclusions misguide the reader, because it is instead the 
patterns of club membership which serve to explain the observed income dynamics, and that 
capital investment is only responding endogenously to the coalition structures, which are in turn 
generating “conditional convergence”.  
 
Empirical Models of Distribution Dynamics 
 
Intra-distributional mobility is estimated by two empirical models: stochastic kernels and 
transition probability matrices1. Of the two models, the transition probability matrix is the 
discrete model, while the stochastic kernel is its continuous version. The underlying formal 
structure of these models as a law of motion of the cross section distribution of income is detailed 
in Quah (1996b).   
 
The distribution dynamics approach tracks the evolution of the income distribution by estimating 
probabilities of intra-distributional mobility – in having to do so, it treats the income distribution 
as a random element in a space of distributions, called the random field. The density of the 
income distribution is estimated at each point of time, and its dynamics of evolution are estimated 
using transition probability matrices and stochastic kernels.  
 
In estimating the dynamics of the income distribution, there are two possibilities for an 
economy’s (in our case, an Indian state) behaviour – over a given period of time, it may have 
either driven ahead, caught up with the richer states, it may have fallen behind, or even stagnated. 
Both transition probability matrices and stochastic kernels estimate probabilities of mobility or 
persistence of a given economy. 
 
Estimating probabilities of intra-distributional mobility of an Indian state involves first identifying 
its location in the initial period, and then tracking its movement to other parts of the distribution. 
                                                 
1 See Bandyopadhyay (2000a) for the use of other models to highlight the distribution dynamics. Transition 
probability matrices and stochastic kernels are, however, the main tools used to describe the distribution 
dynamics. 
  5The transition probability matrix divides the initial income distribution into a number of intervals, 
called “income states” – for example, let the first income interval (or income state) consist of a 
range of incomes from a fifth to a third of the average national income. Typically, states like 
Rajasthan, and Bihar would lie within such an income state. The transition probability matrix 
would typically estimate the probability of mobility of an economy (an Indian state), moving from 
its original location to that of following income states. Thus, for instance, we are interested in the 
possibility that states like Rajasthan and Bihar move to a higher income state. The probabilities 
obtained, give us the percentages of economies (in our case, Indian states) which given a starting 
income state, have moved on to a different state. Thus row probabilities add to one. 
 
The transition probability matrix also allows us to take a long run view of the evolution of the 
income distribution. This is tabulated in the row called the “Ergodic Distribution”.   
 
A shortcoming of the transition probability matrix is that as the selection of income states is 
arbitrary - different sets of discretisations may lead to different results. The stochastic kernel 
improves on the transition probability matrix by replacing the discrete income states by a 
continuum of states2. This means that we no longer have a grid of fixed income states, like (0.2 
0.5), (0.5 0.75) etc. but allow the states to be all possible intervals of income. By this we remove 
the arbitrariness in the discretisation of the states. We now have an infinite number of rows and 
columns replacing the transition probability matrix. 
 
Reading the stochastic kernel is as follows. A slice running parallel to the horizontal axis (i.e. t + k 
axis) sketches a probability density function which describes the transitions from one part of the 
income distribution to another over k periods. The location of the probability mass within the t 
axis and t + k axis grid informs us of any possibilities of intra-distributional mobility. 
Concentration of the probability mass along the positive slope indicates persistence in the 
economies’ relative position and therefore low mobility. The opposite, i.e. concentration along the 
negative slope, would imply overtaking of the economies in their rankings. Concentration of the 
probability mass parallel to the t + k axis indicates that the probability of being in any state at 
period t + k is independent of their position in period t – i.e. evidence for low persistence. Finally, 
convergence is indicated when the probability mass runs parallel to the t axis. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Such refinement goes beyond the generalisation as well. It is well known that discretisation may well remove 
the Markov property from an otherwise well behaved Markov process, Chung (1960) 
  63. The Stylised Facts: Twin Peaks 
Tables 1 to 2a-d present the transition probability matrices estimated over the following sub-
periods: 1965 to 1970, 1970-1980, 1981 to 1989, and 1990 to 1997.   
 
Interpretation of the tables is as follows. Each of the defined states for each table is different, 
such that each distribution is uniform at the beginning year of the sample. The first column of the 
table accounts for the number of transitions over the time period beginning at each state. The 
following columns present the calculated probabilities of transition from one specified state to 
another. A "heavy" main diagonal is bad news - indicating persistence.  
 
The matrix for the sub-period 1965-70 reveals that probabilities in the main diagonal lie around 
50%, indicating that probability of persistence for an economy (Indian state) is around 50%. The 
off-diagonal values are discouragingly low – with the exception of the above average income 
group. The long run view of whether economies will converge over the long run is given by the 
ergodic distribution. The results suggest that over the long run, the probability that an economy 
lands up in the 4th state is the highest, a little over 40%. What is encouraging is that the lower 
income groups vanish in the ergodic distribution. 
 
The second period also reveals tendencies of both persistence and mobility, though persistence is 
more evident than mobility – this is particularly so for the lower and upper income groups. Again, 
mobility is observed for some high income groups states. This trend continues in the next two 
periods. One should also note, however, that as these estimates are based on time stationary 
transition matrices, it may not be reliable for long periods due to structural changes.  
 
The stochastic kernel estimates complement and conform with the results of the transition 
matrices obtained. Figures 1a to 1d represent the stochastic kernels and contour plots for relative 
per capita income of 1-year transitions for four sub-periods 1965-70, 1971–1980, 1981-88, and 
1989-97. While the earlier years indicate some tendencies of convergence, later years increasingly 
reveal tendencies of persistence (in their relative positions) and diverging incomes.  Over 1965-70, 
we obtain some tendencies of convergence – with two sharp peaks at either end of the probability 
mass, running parallel to the t axis. The two clubs of states lie at 50% (lower) and 125% (upper) 
of he national average.  
 
Over the following periods, however, one observes increasing tendencies of persistence, and all 
signs of convergence observed over 1965-70 slowly dissipate. Over the periods 1965-70, 1971-80, 
  71981-88, 1989-1997 we observe in Fig. 1a-d the probability mass lengthening and shifting totally 
in line with the positive diagonal, the two peaks still at the two ends of the mass. One observes 
empirics of divergence and polarization - with increasing tendencies of the diverging states to 
cluster with a high income club, or a low income club. 
  
 
4. Conditioning  
 
 
It is often unclear in such analyses about what kind of conditioning variables are appropriate in 
understanding the lack of cohesion. It is unclear still as to what may explain polarizing dynamics 
as obtained in our study. One can intuitively suggest a large number of explanations as to what 
may underpin such dynamics. In some well-known studies many such variables are included as 
the right hand side explanatory variables in a convergence regression, whose inclusion is justified 
by the intuition that they would influence growth in the long run. Examples are of human capital, 
physical capital, democracy, composition of GDP, democracy etc.  
 
In the empirical and theoretical literature, the influence of the stable macroeconomy is considered 
to be essential (but not sufficient) for sustainable economic growth. Endogenous growth theories 
have also stressed the role of factors like fiscal policy in determining long run growth (Barro 
1991b, Rebelo 1991, Stokey and Rebelo 1995). The empirical literature on the other hand, has 
estimated a number of significant correlations, which have shed light on the complexity of the 
relationships. Easterly and Rebelo (1992) present convincing evidence of fiscal deficits being 
negatively related to growth, while Levine and Renelt (1992) show that high growth countries are 
with lower inflation, have smaller governments and lower black market premia, but the 
relationships are established to be fragile (with the exception of investment ratio). Fischer (1991) 
too, extending the basic Levine and Renelt regression reveals that growth is significantly 
negatively associated with inflation and positively with budget surplus as a ratio of GDP. The 
relationship between growth and inflation too has been heavily investigated. Levine and Zervous’s 
(1992) study reveals that inflation is significant, though only for high inflation countries.  A 
composite indicator of (lower) inflation and (lower) fiscal deficit is revealed to be positively 
related with growth. Similar studies of Bruno and Easterly (1998) also reveal high inflation crises 
to be associated with output losses.  
 
  8Again, different countries, states or regions within counties, respond differently to a particular 
macro-policy framework depending on their market structure, credit markets, and infrastructure, 
to mention the least. A cursory comparison of some Indian states will clarify the reader on the 
importance of such issues for the Indian case in particular. Consider, on the one hand, Bihar: with 
poor basic infrastructure, low industrialization, agriculture based economy, poor infrastructure in 
terms of schools, health, power, transport and communication etc. Compare Bihar with Punjab – 
agriculture highly developed, infrastructure greatly developed in terms of education, health, power 
and transport. The wide schism separating the rich states from the poor in terms of their average 
per capita income is indeed great, but is manifold more when one compares their basic 
infrastructural statistics. 
 
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of a number of few macroeconomic indicators 
and a few infrastructural indicators in explaining the observed twin peaked dynamics. In the 
following section we will extend the distribution dynamics methodology for the conditioning 
exercise, which will be followed by the conditioning.  
 
 
Conditioning in distribution dynamics 
Given that our fundamental object of study is a distribution, and no longer a conditional average 
as was the case under standard regression methods, empirically accounting for the patterns of the 
income distribution involves eschewing standard techniques of conditioning. The approach 
adopted here, popularized by Quah (1996b), is analogous to constructing a conditional 
distribution from the unconditional distribution, in classical probability theory. Explaining 
features such as polarization, means obtaining a conditional distribution such that no such 
features appear. This compares to the traditional cross section regression approach in that while 
in that approach we would be comparing E(Y) and E(Y|X), for the distribution dynamics 
approach we would be comparing Y and Y|X.  
 
So, how does one estimate the conditional distributions? Given that our auxiliary factors are 
macroeconomic indicators and infrastructural indicators, one can anticipate issues with 
endogeneity. This is discussed and the conditional distributions are derived in the following 
section. Our tools for the distribution dynamics are again the stochastic kernel, where a mapping 
is obtained from the unconditional distribution to the conditional distribution. If the auxiliary 
factors were successful in removing the twin peaked features, then the mapping would result in 
  9what is commonly called conditional convergence – with the probability mass running parallel to 
the original unconditional axis.  
 
Endogeneity 
As is often encountered in macroeconomic analyses, endogeneity of macroeconomic variables is 
common and is treated rigorously. Granger causality tests are performed to confirm such 
endogeneity3. The regressions are obtained by OLS, pooling cross section and time series 
observations. Unlike standard panel applications, we do not allow for individual effects, to allow 
for the permanent differences in growth rates across states.  Granger tests for bivariate VAR4s in 
GDP (per capita) growth rates and the auxiliary variables we are testing for, indicate significant 
dynamic inter-dependence between growth and our auxiliary variables. This implies that while the 
variable, for example, infrastructure, does help to predict future growth, it is itself incrementally 
predicted by lagged growth. Given that our auxiliary variables are endogenously determined, we 
need to estimate the appropriate conditional distribution free from the feedback  effects. 
 
We will obtain the conditioned distribution by regressing growth rates on a two sided distributed 
lag of the time varying conditioning variables and then extracting the fitted residuals for 
subsequent analysis. The residuals will constitute the relevant conditioning distribution 
irrespective of the exogeneity of the right hand side variables. The method derives from that 
suggested by Sims (1972)5, where endogeneity (or the lack of it) is determined by regressing the 
endogenous variable on the past, current and future values of the exogenous variables, and 
observing whether the future values of the exogenous variables have significant zero co-efficients. 
If they are zero, then one can say that there exists no “feedback”, or bi-directional causality. 
Needless to say, the residuals resulting from such an exercise would constitute the variation of the 
dependent variable unexplained by the set of exogenous variables, irrespective of endogeneity. We 
present the results for these two-sided regressions in Table 3. All projections reveal that fiscal 
deficits at lead 1 though lag 2 appear significant for predicting growth, but other leads and lags, 
not so consistently. Fit does not seem to improve with increasing lags (or leads). The co-efficients 
of the two sided projections also appear to be fairly stable.  The residuals for the second lead-lag 
projections are saved to be the conditioned distribution of growth on fiscal deficits. We also 
obtain other conditioned distributions with auxiliary variables of capital expenditure, education 
expenditure, inflation and interest expenditure and own tax revenue.  
                                                 
3 Results are not presented in paper due to space constraints, and are obtainable from the author. 
4 Vector Autoregressions 
5 This method has been adopted by Quah (1996a) to obtain the conditional distribution 




5. Conditioning Results 
Figures 2 to 8 present the stochastic kernels mapping the unconditioned to conditioned 
distributions, for the five conditioning auxiliary factors. Figures 2 presents the stochastic kernel 
representing conditioning with fiscal deficits. Here we observe that while the probability mass lies 
predominantly on the diagonal, there are some individual clusters of states, at 50% of the national 
average running off the diagonal, parallel to the original axis. The clusters are clearly identified in 
the contour plot in Figure 3b. These clusters are evidence that fiscal deficits do serve to explain 
the formation of the higher income club. 
 
Conditioning with capital expenditure, results in similar observations, as in Figure 3. Here too one 
obtains evidence of some conditional convergence. The probability mass runs mainly along the 
diagonal, while isolated clusters run off the kernel, parallel to the original axis. Inspection of the 
contour also reveals the kernel to be twisting anti-clockwise at the higher and lower income levels, 
also indicating tendencies of obtaining conditional convergence at those levels.  
 
Conditioning with state development expenditure (Fig 4) reveals similar dynamics – dominant 
features characterising the kernel are that of persistence, while signs of mobility are evident at the 
tails.  
 
Conditioning on inflation and interest expenditure, reveals no interesting insights in how they 
explain disparate growth performances – Figures 5 and 6 have the probability mass running 
decidedly along the diagonal.  
 
The infrastructure indicators6 (panel data) which we use for the analysis are the following. The 
states covered for the analysis are stated in the Appendix, and the period of study is 1977-1993. 
There are no missing observations. 
 
Per capita electrical consumption (in kilowatt hours) 
                                                 
6 The infrastructure indicators’ data set has been provided by the India team, Development Centre, OECD, 
Paris. The author gratefully acknowledges thanks to Dr. A. Varoudakis and Dr. M.Veganzones for kindly 
providing the data set. 
  11Per capita industrial consumption of electricity 
Percentage of villages electrified. 
Percentage if gross cropped area irrigated 
Road length ( in kms per 1,000 square kms) 
Number of motor vehicles  per 1,000 population. 
Rail track length (in kms per 1,000 sq.kms) 
Literacy rates ( in percentage of the age group) 
Primary school enrolment (age 6-11, in percentage of the age group) 
Secondary school enrolment (age 11-17, in percentage of the age-group) 
Infant mortality ( in percentage) 
Number of bank offices per 1,000 population 
Bank deposits as a percentage of the SDP 
Bank credit as a percentage of the SDP 
 
We construct a single index accounting for the each of the state’s infrastructure base. We use 
factor analysis to obtain the general index of infrastructure. This technique is a method of data 
reduction and attempts to describe the indicators as linear combinations of a small number of 
latent variables7. Results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 4. We accept the first factor 
F1 (which has an eigenvalue of 12). To now account for possible endogeneity, we perform similar 
lead-lag regressions and extract the residuals that now constitute the conditional distribution.  
 
Fig 7 show the cross-state distributions conditioning on infrastructure – the results obtained are 
encouraging, particularly so for the higher income and lower income group states. Level of 
infrastructure, hence, does not appear to be a factor which explains cross section disparity in 
middle income group states. Conditional convergence is especially clear for the range of incomes 
above 1.2 times the national average, and states with incomes below the national average, more 
clearly revealed in the contour plot. That we observe infrastructure serving to explain the 
observed dynamics at different levels of the distribution is interesting in that it would not have 
been revealed so under standard regression techniques. Parametric tests confirming conditional 
convergence with infrastructure are not included in the results here due to the length of the paper, 
see Bandyopadhyay (2000b). 
 
                                                 
7 This method was first used in development economics by Adelman and Morriss (1967) in an ambitious 
project to study the interaction of economic and non-economic forces in the course of development, with 
data on 41 social, economic and political indicators for 74 countries. For further discussion, see Adelman 
and Morriss (1967), and for more on factor analysis, see  Everitt (1984). 
  12We finally isolate education (measured as primary and secondary school enrolment) as an auxiliary 
variable, to observe its role in explaining the income dynamics. First, we construct a similar index 
of education, applying factor analysis and use the first factor as our index. Similar endogeneity 
tests are performed, and the residuals from earlier two-sided lead-lag regressions are extracted as 
the conditional distribution. Fig 8 presents the conditioning results. Here again, one observes 
tendencies of the lower income club showing signs of convergence, while the higher income 
group remains unexplained. Once again, one observes that education serves to explain coalition at 
the lower income levels.  
 
Conditioning results with transition probability matrices  
 
Transition matrices for fiscal deficits (in Tables 6a) exhibit signs of partial mobility – it is at the 
middle income groups that one observes mobility, but not at the peaks. The values pertaining to 
these income states are smaller on the diagonals, with off-diagonal values increasing in value. 
There is, however, no tendency towards conditional convergence. 
 
 
The capital expenditure matrix (Table 6b) reveals a tendency of intra-distributional mobility of the 
middle income group towards lower and higher income states. This adds to our findings of the 
stochastic  kernel – capital expenditure seems to marginally explain the polarisation of growth 
performances for the middle income group of states.  
 
Likewise, state development expenditure conditioning (Tables 6c) exhibits similar signs of partial 
mobility – it is at the middle income groups that one observes some mobility, but not at the 
peaks. The probabilities on the diagonals are significantly smaller, with off-diagonal values 
increasing in value. The second and third income classes seem to exhibit most of the mobility. 
There is, however, no tendency of conditional convergence. 
 
 
Tables 6d and 6f once again represent estimates of intra-distributional mobility using capital 
inflation and interest expenditure as the conditioning variables. Here too one observes little 
evidence of either factor explaining the observed twin-peakedness. These results support standard 
parametric results where inconclusive results are obtained as well8. 
                                                 
8 These results are not detailed in this paper due to its length. 
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Finally the infrastructure conditioning matrix too, exhibits signs of mobility, particularly that of 
the lower income states. These results confirm those obtained with the stochastic kernel. 
 
To summarise the results obtained, one finds that factors of capital expenditure and fiscal deficits 
partially explain the formation of the higher income club, while infrastructure, and to an extent 
education, measured as school enrolment, explains the formation of the lower income club. If one 
were to apply standard regression techniques, one could very well obtain evidence of conditional 
convergence, on controlling for these auxiliary factors9. The dynamics revealed in this paper 
clarify how such a conclusion can mislead the reader in deducing that these auxiliary variables 
explain the cross- state patterns of growth. What is highlighted in the results is that different 
auxiliary factors serve to explain club membership at different levels. While education, and our 
general index of infrastructure serve to explain cohesive forces within the lower income club, 
capital expenditure and fiscal deficits (partially) do so for the higher income club. These empirical 
regularities both sketch and explain specific income dynamics, particularly that of patterns of 
distributions, not revealed by standard approaches. It is clear from these empirical facts that 
different policies are to be targeted for different states, and that a global all-encompassing policy 
for all states would not serve well to bridge the wide disparities in economic growth across Indian 
states.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the convergence of growth and incomes with reference to the Indian 
states using an empirical model of dynamically evolving distributions. The model reveals “twin 
peaks” dynamics, or polarisation across the Indian states, over 1965-1998 - empirics which would 
not be revealed under standard empirical methods of cross section , panel data, and time series 
econometrics. We find that the dominant cross-state income dynamics are that of persistence, 
immobility and polarisation, with some cohesive tendencies in the 1960s, only to dissipate over 
the following three decades. These findings contrast starkly with those emphasised in works of 
Bajpai and Sachs 1996, Nagaraj et al 1998, and Rao Shand and Kalirajan 1999. Such dynamics 
warn on potential misinterpretations of conditional convergence regressions. 
 
A conditioning methodology using the same empirical tools further reveals that such income 
dynamics are explained by the disparate distribution of infrastructure and to an extent by fiscal 
                                                 
9 Panel regressions within the standard regression framework are obtainable from the author, where one does 
obtain conditional convergence with the auxiliary variables in use for this exercise.  
  14deficit and capital expenditure patterns. Unlike standard methods, this model allows us observe 
the income dynamics at different levels of the distribution. Infrastructure, and education, seems to 
strongly explain the formation of the lower convergence club, while fiscal deficits and capital 
expenditure patterns explains club formation at higher income levels. Such stylised facts are 
interesting for policy purposes in tracking the forces which govern growth dynamics across the 
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Other states were excluded from the study due to the incomplete data available over the given 
period. 
 
  20Table 1: Inter-State ( per capita) income dynamics, 1965-97 





Upper end point 
 












               0.40              0.00              0.40               0.00               0.20 
 
               0.00              0.40              0.20               0.20               0.20 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.50               0.00               0.50 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.25               0.25               0.50 
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Table2a: Inter-State ( per capita) income dynamics, 1965-70 





Upper end point 
 












               0.40              0.00              0.40               0.00               0.20 
 
               0.00              0.40              0.20               0.20               0.20 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.50               0.00               0.50 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.25               0.25               0.50 
 









Table2b: Inter-State relative ( per capita) income dynamics, 1971-80 





Upper end point 
 












               0.40              0.60              0.00               0.00               0.00 
 
               0.00              1.00              0.00               0.00               0.00 
 
               0.00              0.67              0.33               0.00               0.00 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.75               0.25               0.00 
 




            0.00                 1.00             0.00               0.00               0.00 
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Table2c: Inter-State relative ( per capita) income dynamics, 1981-89 





Upper end point 
 












               0.17              0.50              0.33               0.00               0.00 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.25               0.75               0.00 
 
               0.00              0.67              0.33               0.67               0.00 
 
               0.00              0.00              0.00               0.00               1.00 
 








Table2d: Inter-State relative ( per capita) income dynamics, 1988-97 






Upper end point 
 












          1.00              0.00              0.00               0.00               0.00 
 
          0.00              1.00              0.00               0.00               0.00 
 
          0.00              0.00              1.00               0.00               0.00 
 
          0.00              0.00              0.00               0.67               0.33 
 




         1.00                 0.00             0.00               0.00               0.00 
 














Co-efficients in two-sided projections 
 
Lead                  4 
 
                         3 
 
                         2 
 





























































-0.01 -0.04  -0.014 
R 2  0. 10  0. 10  0. 11 
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are OLS and White heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors.  
  24Table 4 
 


























                  
          
 
Factor Loadings 
                                    
 f1  f2  f3 
total power consumption  0.97  -0.16  0.10 
power consumption in 
industrial sector 
0.95   -0.12  0.04 
percentage of villages 
electrified 
0.99 0.04  -0.08 
percentage of net area 
operated with irrigation 
0.95 -0.20 0.18 
length of road network per 
1000 sq kms. 
0.97 -0.12 0.10 
number of motor vehicles 
per 1000 inhabitants 
0.89 0.07  -0.37 
length of rail network per 
1000 sq.kms 
0.61 -0.47 0.60 
literacy rate of adult 
population 
0.98 -0.04  -0.15 
primary school enrolment 
rate 
0.97 0.04  -0.08 
secondary school 
enrolment rate 
0.98 -0.13  -0.02 
infant mortality rate  -0.96  0.05  0.22 
bank offices per 1000 
people 
0.91 0.24  -0.30 
bank deposits as a 
percentage of SDP 
0.75 0.57 0.28 
bank credit as a percentage 
of SDP 
0.58 0.68 0.40 
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Table 6a. Inter-state  conditioning on fiscal deficit, 
transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   














































































Table 6b. Inter-state  conditioning on capital expenditure 
transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   
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Table 6c. Inter-state conditioning on state development expenditure, 
transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   















































































                    Table 6d. Inter-state conditioning on inflation, transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   
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Table 6e. Inter-state  conditioning on interest expenditure, 
transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   













































































Table 6f. Inter-state conditioning on infrastructure 
             transition matrix 
 
Upper end point   
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Fig.2 a and b. Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 
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Fig. 3a and b. Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 
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Fig.4 a and b. Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 
State development expenditure conditioning, with contour  
 
 








 Fig 5 . Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 





Fig. 6 . Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 





  36Fig. 7a and b Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 
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Fig 8a and b. Relative per capita incomes across Indian states 
Education conditioning, with contour plot 
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